#### § 2.22

RTGs can provide a means of coordinating regional planning of the transmission system and assuring that system capabilities are always adequate to meet system demands. RTG agreements that contain components that satisfy paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section generally will be considered to be just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential under the Federal Power Act (FPA). The Commission encourages RTG agreements that contain as much detail as possible in all of the components listed, particularly if the RTG participants will be seeking Commission deference to decisions reached under an RTG agreement.

- (b) Organizational components. (1) An RTG agreement should provide for broad membership and, at a minimum, allow any entity that is subject to, or eligible to apply for, an order under section 211 of the FPA to be a member. An RTG agreement should encompass an area of sufficient size and contiguity to enable members to provide transmission services in a reliable, efficient, and competitive manner.
- (2) An RTG agreement should provide a means of adequate consultation and coordination with relevant state regulatory, siting, and other authorities.
- (3) An RTG agreement should include fair and nondiscriminatory governance and decisionmaking procedures, including voting procedures.
- (c) Other components. (1) An RTG agreement should impose on member transmitting utilities an obligation to provide transmission services for other members, including the obligation to enlarge facilities, on a basis that is consistent with sections 205, 206, 211, 212 and 213 of the FPA. To the extent practicable and known, the RTG agreement should specify the terms and conditions under which transmission services will be offered.
- (2) An RTG agreement should require, at a minimum, the development of a coordinated transmission plan on a regional basis and the sharing of transmission planning information, with the goal of efficient use, expansion, and coordination of the interconnected electric system on a grid-wide basis. An RTG agreement should provide mechanisms to incorporate the transmission

needs of non-members into regional plans. An RTG agreement should include as much detail as possible with regard to operational and planning procedures.

- (3) An RTG agreement should include voluntary dispute resolution procedures that provide a fair alternative to resorting in the first instance to section 206 complaints or section 211 proceedings.
- (4) An RTG agreement should include an exit provision for RTG members that leave the RTG, specifying the obligations of a departing member.
- (d) Filing procedures. Any proposed RTG agreement that in any manner affects or relates to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce by a public utility, or rates or charges for such transmission, must be filed with the Commission. Any public utility member of a proposed RTG may file the RTG agreement with the Commission on behalf of the other public utility members under section 205 of the FPA.

[58 FR 41632, Aug. 5, 1993]

#### §2.22 Pricing policy for transmission services provided under the Federal Power Act.

- (a) The Commission has adopted a Policy Statement on its pricing policy for transmission services provided under the Federal Power Act. That Policy Statement can be found at 69 FERC 61,086. The Policy Statement constitutes a complete description of the Commission's guidelines for assessing the pricing proposals. Paragraph (b) of this section is only a brief summary of the Policy Statement.
- (b) The Commission endorses transmission pricing flexibility, consistent with the principles and procedures set forth in the Policy Statement. It will entertain transmission pricing proposals that do not conform to the traditional revenue requirement as well as proposals that conform to the traditional revenue requirement. The Commission will evaluate "conforming" transmission pricing proposals using the following five principles, described more fully in the Policy Statement.
- (1) Transmission pricing must meet the traditional revenue requirement.

- (2) Transmission pricing must reflect comparability.
- (3) Transmission pricing should promote economic efficiency.
- (4) Transmission pricing should promote fairness.
- (5) Transmission pricing should be practical.
- (c) Under these principles, the Commission will also evaluate "non-conforming" proposals which do not meet the traditional revenue requirement, and will require such proposals to conform to the comparability principle. Non-conforming proposals must include an open access comparability tariff and will not be allowed to go into effect prior to review and approval by the Commission under procedures described in the Policy Statement.

[59 FR 55039, Nov. 3, 1994]

# § 2.23 Use of reserved authority in hydropower licenses to ameliorate cumulative impacts.

The Commission will address and consider cumulative impact issues at original licensing and relicensing to the fullest extent possible consistent with the Commission's statutory responsibility to avoid undue delay in the relicensing process and to avoid undue delay in the amelioration of individual project impacts at relicensing. To the extent, if any, that it is not possible to explore and address all cumulative impacts at relicensing, the Commission will reserve authority to examine and address such impacts after the new license has been issued, but will define that reserved authority as narrowly and with as much specificity as possible, particularly with respect to the purpose of reserving that authority. The Commission intends that such articles will describe, to the maximum extent possible, reasonably foreseeable future resource concerns that may warrant modifications of the licensed project. Before taking any action pursuant to such reserved authority, the Commission will publish notice of its proposed action and will provide an opportunity for hearing by the licensee and all interested parties. Hydropower licenses also contain standard "reopener" articles (see §2.9 of this part) which reserve authority to the Commission to require, among other

things, licensees of projects located in the same river basin to mitigate the cumulative impacts of those projects on the river basin. In light of the policy described above, the Commission will use the standard "reopener" articles to explore and address cumulative impacts only (except in extraordinary circumstances) where such impacts were not known at the time of licensing or are the result of changed circumstances. The Commission has authority under the Federal Power Act to require licensees, during the term of the license, to develop and provide data to the Commission on the cumulative impacts of licensed projects located in the same river basin. In issuing both new and original licenses, the Commission will coordinate the expiration dates of the licenses to the maximum extent possible, to maximize future consideration of cumulative impacts at the same time in contemporaneous proceedings at relicensing. The Commission's intention is to consider to the extent practicable cumulative impacts at the time of licensing and relicensing, and to eliminate the need to resort to the use of reserved authority.

[59 FR 66718, Dec. 28, 1994]

### § 2.24 Project decommissioning at relicensing.

The Commission issued a statement of policy on project decommissioning at relicensing in Docket No. RM93-23-000 on December 14, 1994.

[60 FR 347, Jan. 4, 1995]

# § 2.25 Ratemaking treatment of the cost of emissions allowances in coordination transactions.

- (a) General Policy. This Statement of Policy is adopted in furtherance of the goals of Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101–549, Title IV, 104 Stat. 2399, 2584 (1990).
- (b) Costing Emissions Allowances in Coordination Sales. If a public utility's coordination rate on file with the Commission provides for recovery of variable costs on an incremental basis, the Commission will allow recovery of the incremental costs of emissions allowances associated with a coordination